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new to this area. For example, Gardner's treatment of responsibility is perhaps too nuanced to be grasped fully by a first-time reader (though more advanced readers will find it extremely edifying). Other chapters on responsibility will be more immediately accessible to those new to the theory of criminal law. Gaita's chapter, for example, is particularly engrossing because it engages with both academic and popular fictional literature to explore the emotion of guilt and its place in Duff's theory of responsibility. This inter-disciplinary approach is extremely interesting and refreshing.

The next few chapters of *Crime, Punishment and Responsibility* concern Duff's work on criminal attempts. Some of these contributions mark the latest stage in long-running disputes. For instance, Ashworth's chapter on the law's "ambivalence" to outcomes builds on his previous exchanges with Duff, exploring points of agreement and continued dispute. Other chapters on attempts liability explore brand new arguments. Tadros's chapter on outcome luck is a good example. Tadros sets out a unique view of punishment conceived of in terms of obligations, with strong parallels drawn between self-defence and punishment. This is then related back to the law's approach to outcomes in an intriguing way.

The final contributions deal with criminalisation, a topic which Duff has turned his attention to recently as a member of an Arts and Humanities Research Council research team. These chapters are all excellent contributions to this field. Particular mention should go to Dempsey's treatment of when the State may legitimately criminalise ostensibly "private" wrongdoing, particularly in cases (such as domestic violence) where the victim may not be willing to have the criminal law involved. Dempsey explains well the harm that might be caused by ignoring such disputes, and – building on previous work – proposes a theoretical account of when State involvement is necessitated, tying this into Duff's work on criminalisation.

The book closes with responses (some more detailed than others) to each contributor from Duff. One difficulty is that, for ease of reading, Duff deals with the chapters out of sequence. If, like me, the reader finds it easier to look at the relevant section of Duff's response immediately after reading the chapter to which it relates, then this can prove frustrating. The reader will no doubt become familiar (as I did) with page 353, where Duff sets out his order of business.

What Duff's responses demonstrate is that this is a book filled with very real disputes, many of which have been ignored here for concerns of space. The wonderful thing about this text is that it does not read like a "normal" festschrift. There is never an air of sycophancy, and many of the authors attack Duff with vigour. As Duff himself recognises in his response (351), this is not a farewell to a retiring academic, but rather the latest stage in arguments which will no doubt continue to run and run. Although some contributors succeed in making Duff give up some ground, his responses demonstrate a commitment to his ideas that he has used to enlighten those interested in criminal law for over thirty years. And long may he continue to do so.

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WHAT IS CRIMINOLOGY? Eds Mary Bosworth and Carolyn Hoyle

Oxford: Oxford University Press (www.oup.com), 2011. xxxvi + 551pp. ISBN 978019-9571826 (hb). £75.

In their contribution to this impressive and intriguing collection Shadd Maruna and Charles Barber ask "why can't criminology be more like medical research?". Their response is

something of a cautionary note, particularly for criminologists with highly laudable aspirations to make policy development, and the design of practical interventions and initiatives, more evidence-based (aspirations lent currency as the REF approaches and research councils increasingly demand that 'impact' be demonstrated). Amongst other things, they argue that criminology has long benefited from the different methodological approaches that have contributed to its development, and that tendencies to privilege experimental design and systematic review criteria of research within medicine and psychiatry should not be uncritically emulated, particularly in a discipline whose subject matter has such contested contours, and which should necessarily concern itself not only with empirical rigour, but also with normative reflection. These knotty issues get to the heart of some of the methodological and political boundaries (to use the terminology of the editors) that ultimately characterise the wider field of criminology and animate many (if not all) of the other contributions to this book, lending it a critical tone and sense of engagement that one might not necessarily expect in similarly titled collections. Maruna and Barber invoke Nikolas Rose's critique of historical overviews of disciplines (psychiatry being the target in this case), describing them as having an unfortunate tendency to be "self serving hagiographies with a familiar structure—in the beginning, there was cruelty and confusion, but as the field became progressively more scientific over time, conditions have continuously improved" (321).

This is assuredly *not* a criticism of *What is Criminology?*², an important collection that displays no such complacency, and which in fact is notable for being rather the opposite, providing something of a lesson in how to do justice to the complexity of a field. The editors have encouraged contributors to explore the contours and borders of criminology by posing to them challenging questions about its purposes, its impact (or lack thereof) on the world, its methodological and ideological commitments and orientations, its focus and priorities, the threats and challenges it grapples with, and the intended and unintended directions it has moved towards in recent decades. It is true that some contributors have interpreted their brief more 'broadly' than others but this makes for a more engrossing read that provides no easy 'overview' of the field, but instead a stimulating series of scholarly, sometimes conversational, sometimes polemical, ruminations on criminology as both a complex and contested field of study and label of academic affiliation—one that is very much still evolving. To my mind, one of the really distinctive contributions of the collection, taken as a whole, is its sustained engagement with this latter point. What does it *mean* to be a criminologist in the early 21st century? Many of the contributions, in different ways, explore the underlying politics of criminological research (McLaughlin): the possibilities of, and potential trade-offs involved in, public engagement and intervention (Loader and Sparks; Blumstein; Newburn); the normative commitments to social justice, equality and human rights that form its ethics (Richie; Brown; Sokoloff and Burgess-Proctor); and the scientific and value judgements implicated in making methodological choices and prioritisations—whether about the use of randomized control trials (Hough; Sherman), ethnographies (Shearing and Marks), or the broader claims to truth and 'scientific truth' of the discipline, or official variants of it, as a whole (Hope). With politics of course comes the possibility of unhelpful and limiting evangelism (Carlen) where particular standpoints (political and methodological) create unnecessary boundaries. Being a criminologist in the late 21st clearly involves negotiating these boundaries, whether that entails 'drifting' across and creatively transgressing them (Ferrell), or being mindful of the focus and purpose that they can provide (Zedner). But it also, more recently, involves looking outwards, beyond the Anglo-American mainstream towards analyses of global and transnational problems (Bowling; Parmentier) and the circuits through which criminological knowledge and crime control policy have evolved an international currency (Franko Aas). Bosworth and Coyle give some emphasis to this

overarching theme – professional identity – by concluding the book with Liebling’s humane reflections on years of prisons research, the slow and often modest change that can be forged through it, and the emotional and personal investments implied in being appreciative of, and giving voice to, those whose voices are often silenced or caricatured. As she notes, “[i]f we go in deep, as we should, it is sometimes hard to emerge, unchanged, unmoved, intact” (527).

Over 36 chapters Bosworth and Coyle’s collection provides unsurpassed insight into the rocky, but nonetheless exciting, terrain to be negotiated in being a criminologist. It is essential reading for those already negotiating (and perhaps lost on) that terrain, and must surely become both a comprehensive and challenging resource for the orientation of newcomers.

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Per Andersen, LEGAL PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE IN MEDIEVAL DENMARK

Leiden: Brill (www.brill.nl), Medieval Law and Its Practice vol 11, 2011. xiv + 452 pp. ISBN 9789004204768. €155.

Danish legal history is not among the best-known legal histories in Europe, largely because research in more widely-spoken languages has been lacking. Per Andersen’s work now helps to fill this lacuna insofar as the history of procedural law is concerned. Andersen’s approach, however, is anything but domestic, setting out to explain the development of medieval Danish procedure from a comparative perspective. Abandoning a “state-evolutionary tradition” of historiography, Andersen observes Denmark in the larger context of European learned law.

Andersen’s book is divided into two parts. The first covers the period of so-called provincial laws before 1300, which I would call a formative period in the development of the Danish law of procedure. This is when, as Andersen demonstrates, most of the essential features of Danish procedural law are put into place. The second part extends from where the first part ends to the middle of the sixteenth century. Continuity rather than radical change characterises the second phase.

The study covers all the most important secular courts: the local courts (*herredsting*), the intermediate courts (*landsting*) and the royal judicial power. In addition, the patrimonial courts (*birkeret*) receive attention as well as the town courts. Of the major courts, the author thus excludes only the ecclesiastical. Andersen not only uses legislation as his material, but attempts to look at how legal practice corresponded to the wishes of the legislator as well. This creates a productive and interesting setting.

Danish medieval law was actually never a unified legal order, consisting instead of three different provincial laws: those of Scania, Zealand and Jutland, all dating to the first half of the thirteenth century. The author’s main contention here is that whereas the Laws of Scania and Zealand show the influence of Romano-canonical procedure less, the Law of Jutland “reflects a qualitatively different stage of learned law... and is fundamentally equal to contemporary learned law outside Denmark.” The changes were, as Andersen convincingly argues, necessary because the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 had prohibited clerics from participating in blood ordeals.